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Abstract 
The Major Projects Agreement (MPA) is a framework agreement designed to 
improve performance in large mechanical and electrical engineering projects. It 
is built on integrated team working and includes the trade union as a partner in 
strategic, organizational and employment decisions. The agreement was recently 
implemented in the construction of Heathrow Terminal 5 (T5). The use of the 
MPA at T5 illustrates how the promotion of a framework that legitimizes a role 
for  unions  in  continuing  dialogue  with  employers  can  positively  affect 
organizational  outcomes  in  large  construction  projects.  While  serving  as  a 
reminder  that  mechanisms  exist  within  UK  corporate  governance  for  the 
representation and articulation of the interests of non-shareholder constituencies, 
T5 may be a unique case: the currently uncertain future of the MPA is indicative 
of wider constraints on the adoption of the partnership model in Britain.  
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1. Introduction  
In  common  with  other  developed  countries,  the  UK  has  experienced  a 
weakening of the collective basis for industrial relations – indicated by a plunge 
in  the  proportion  of  employees  covered  by  collective  agreements,  declining 
union membership rates and contraction in the scope for bargaining (Oxenbridge 
et al., 2003; Kersley et al., 2006). This has been matched by a strengthening of 
shareholder pressure for higher and more consistent returns on investment and 
the adoption of clear strategies for future performance (Deakin and Whittaker, 
2007).  Against  this  background,  the  emergence  and  successful  operation  of 
labour-management arrangements that define a set of multiple objectives and 
preserve  an  active  role  for  the  trade  unions  has  been  rendered  much  more 
challenging.  
 
This paper looks an important recent case of labour-management partnership, 
namely the construction of the Terminal 5 (T5) at London’s Heathrow Airport. 
T5 took around 20 years to plan and build and started operations in March 2008, 
six years after construction started.  Its opening was marked by confusion and 
controversy,  a  point  to  which  we  return  below.      As  a  construction  project, 
however, T5 was highly successful.  It was based on a novel approach to risk-
sharing between client and suppliers and it incorporated innovative mechanisms 
for deliberation between unions and management.  There is evidence that these 
arrangements contributed positively to a number of successful project outcomes, 
above all the completion of the construction work on time and on budget, an 
above-industry health and safety record, and virtually no time lost to disputes. 
 
The  next  section  outlines  some  general  issues  concerning  the  relationship 
between corporate governance and employee voice. Then key elements of the 
T5 governance process are presented. We analyse the emergence, substance and 
operation of the core agreements and the operation of the arrangements to which 
they gave rise, highlighting the role of employee representation. An assessment 
of  the  contribution  of  this  governance  structure  to  the  construction  project 
follows, along with a discussion on the sustainability of such practices in the 
UK.  
 
2. The relationship between corporate governance and industrial relations 
in the UK  
It  has  been  widely  suggested  that  the  UK  corporate  governance  system  has 
significant  implications  for  industrial  relations  and,  more  specifically,  that  it 
constrains the scope for enduring labour-management partnerships (for a critical 
review  see  Pendleton  and  Gospel,  2005).  Core  institutions  of  UK  corporate 
governance,  in  particular  those  relating  to  takeover  regulation,  corporate   2 
governance codes and the law governing directors’ fiduciary duties, may be seen 
as strongly orientated towards a norm of shareholder primacy (Armour et al., 
2003).  The  City  Code  on  Takeovers  and  Mergers  (Takeover  Panel,  2006) 
maintains  a  regulatory  regime  which  operates  in  favour  of  institutional 
shareholder interests (Deakin and Slinger, 1997; Deakin et al., 2003). Along 
with wide dispersion of share ownership (in the case of listed companies), the 
Takeover Code underpins a market for corporate control in which managerial 
under-performance  leads  to  shareholder  exit  and  consequent  changes  in 
ownership and control. The concern among incumbent management of being 
substituted guides them to pursue shareholders’ goals (Pendleton and Gospel, 
2005:  62)  and  subsequently  makes  it  difficult  for  British  firms  to  build 
‘partnership  arrangements’  with  their  workforces  (Edwards,  2004:  526).  In 
contrast to the situation in coordinated market economies, large scale firms in 
Anglo-Saxon economies that are in distress are likely to reduce labour costs to 
preserve profitability.  Priority is placed on maintaining the level of dividends 
and,  where  possible,  distributing  surplus  cash  to  shareholders  via  share 
repurchases. It is on this basis that firms are able to secure continuing access to 
capital markets, retain credit ratings and defend against takeovers (Gospel and 
Pendleton, 2003: 559).  Waves of restructuring in British and American firms 
since  the  early  1980s  have  undermined  the  ‘implicit  contracts’  which  once 
provided  for  job  security  and  long-term  career  progression  (Shleifer  and 
Summers, 1988: 41-2).  
 
At  the  same  time,  scope  remains  for  managers  to  respond  to  shareholder 
pressures in creative ways which reflect the need to engage with a wider range 
of  constituencies,  including employees.    According to  Pendleton  and  Gospel 
(2005:  79),  the  recent  development  of  relationships  for  the  exchange  of 
information and exercise of influence between major investors and managers of 
large firms has given the latter some autonomy to devise labour strategies as 
they see fit.
1 Deakin et al. (2006) examined the evolution of labour-management 
partnerships in the utilities and manufacturing during the 1990s and early 2000s, 
finding  evidence  that  enduring  and  proactive  partnerships  could  develop,  in 
conditions where management was able convince shareholders of the long-term 
gains from this approach, and where regulatory factors operated to extend the 
time-horizon for financial returns. In particular, they found that regulation of 
product and service quality, of the kind observed in most utility sectors and in 
certain others, favoured the emergence of stable partnerships. This is because in 
these markets, profitability was linked to the ability of companies to maintain a 
high and consistent quality of products and services for end users. As a result, 
companies were better able to convince shareholders to take the view that they 
would reap significant returns over the long term from a stakeholder approach. 
But, when such conditions were absent, partnership arrangements were found to   3 
be highly vulnerable to shareholder pressure, no matter how much goodwill was 
invested by labour and management (Deakin et al., 2006: 171).  
 
While corporate governance impacts on industrial relations and the employment 
relationship, labour law and industrial relations rules in general, as well a given 
firm’s approach to labour relations, can frame management’s options and thus 
influence, in turn, the ownership structure of the firm (Deakin et al., 2006: 157). 
As such, causal influences may run in both directions (Gospel and Pendleton, 
2005). At a collective level, worker representation has been traditionally based 
on  the  so-called  ‘single  channel’  model  of  representation  though  recognized 
unions, with the state supporting collective bargaining as its regulatory method 
of choice (Clark and Winchester, 1994: 714). Beginning in 1975 with legislation 
on collective redundancies, a piecemeal development of statutory requirements 
for consultation with employee representatives on a range of issues, reflecting 
legislative developments at EU-level, has taken place.
2 From 2004, legislation in 
the form of the Information and Consultation of Employees Regulations (ICER)
3 
came into force requiring all firms above a certain size to have information and 
consultation  mechanisms  in  place,  although  this  law  does  not  mandate 
continental  European-style  works  councils  or  enterprise  committees,  and, 
indeed,  leaves  it  open  for  managers  and  unions  to  continue  with  the  single-
channel model collective bargaining where they see it as in their interests to do 
so. 
 
On the industrial relations side, trade unions have historically served as a means 
for mobilizing the collective power of workers, but institutional structures and 
norms  governing  industrial  relations  make  it  significantly  difficult  for 
employees collectively to influence directly the critical strategic decisions of a 
firm.  Employers  and  trade  unions  have  traditionally  given  distribution  more 
importance than the integration of employees into decision-making structures 
(Coats, 2004).  In contrast to the wider range of issues subject to consultation in 
countries with so-called coordinated market economies, collective bargaining in 
the  UK  is  mainly  confined  to  wages,  hours  and  terms  and  conditions  of 
employment  (Oxenbridge  et  al.,  2003).    Reflecting  the  assumption  that  the 
parties engage each other at arms’ length, the mechanisms to support workplace 
justice have been relatively weak and an approach in terms of basic compliance, 
rather  than  using  the  law  as  a  basis  for  improvement,  has  been  favoured 
(Edwards, 2007: 39). 
 
In the mid-1990s, an explicitly collaborative concept of ‘partnership at work’ 
was adopted by part of the British trade union movement, by the government 
and  some  employers  (Guest  and  Peccei,  2001).  In  practice,  trade  union 
enthusiasm for partnership was largely based on the proviso that unions would   4 
be  fully  involved  in  the  process.  But  this  view  was  not  fully  shared  by  the 
government, and even less so by employers (Hall et al., 2002: 27). While there 
is still no agreed definition on what is meant by workplace partnership (Guest 
and Peccei, 2001: 208; Haynes and Allen, 2001: 166; Terry, 2003: 463), at the 
heart of all attempts to define and operationalise the concept of partnership lie 
the two core concepts of mutuality and trust between the relevant parties (Dietz, 
2004; Guest et al., 2008). More specifically, the partnership model is one in 
which employees and their representatives are encouraged to add value to the 
firm by participating in decision making processes, in return for acquiring rights 
and influence over the distribution of the firm’s surplus.  
 
At first sight, multi-firm construction projects such as T5 look like an unlikely 
candidate  for  partnership-type  arrangements.  Representative  structures, 
including those put in place under ICER and other information and consultation 
laws, are designed for single-employer units, and so cannot be easily adapted to 
workplaces  where  subcontracting  as  well  as  the  use  of  agency  and  self-
employed labour are the norm. This, at least, is the conventional picture. The 
experience of T5 suggests, however, that this is not an inevitable outcome. As it 
will  be  seen,  the  structures  put  in  place  at  T5  challenge  conventional 
understandings of what partnership can achieve in the UK context, as well as 
calling  into  question  the  single-employer  focus  of  recent  legal  attempts  to 
encourage employee voice.  
 
T5’s  original  purposes,  organizational  design,  governance  structures,  and 
internal processes exemplify many of the features associated with a stakeholder 
approach  to  corporate  governance  and  labour-management  relations.  The 
concept  of  a  stakeholder  firm  adopted  here  owes  much  to  the  analysis  by 
Kochan and Rubinstein (2000) of Saturn, the US vehicle manufacturer which 
was set up as an experiment in partnership between General Motors and the 
United  Auto  Workers  union.  Saturn  is  a  critical  case  because  the  extent  of 
employee involvement was greater than in other US companies and because the 
experiment was conducted with the active engagement of senior managers and 
the  relevant  trade  union  (Rubinstein  and  Kochan,  2001).  In  contrast  to  a 
conventional American-style shareholder-wealth-maximizing firm, Kochan and 
Rubinstein suggest that a stakeholder firm has the following features. First, such 
firms  pursue  multiple  objectives,  recognising  that  the  different  corporate 
constituencies have distinct interests; second, they adopt governance structures 
that promote effective coordination, cooperation and conflict resolution; third, 
the value created is fairly distributed to maintain commitment of the multiple 
stakeholders; fourth, all stakeholders are residual risk holders in the sense of 
having an interest at stake if the firm fails; and, finally, there are more than one 
stakeholder  with  sufficient  power  and  legitimacy  to  achieve  a  significant   5 
participatory  status  in  governance  processes  (Kochan  and  Rubinstein,  2000: 
369).  
 
In what follows, we present an account of T5 as an instrumental case study in 
the sense described by Stake (2000), that is to say, one which focuses on a 
particular case with a view to the examination of a wider set of issues. The 
specific  case  is  important  because  it  uncovers  knowledge  about  wider 
phenomena of interest, which may not be confined to the case itself.  Evidence 
on the establishment, operation and impact of the MPA and related agreements 
was  available  to  us  in  the  form  of  in-depth,  semi-structured  interviews  with 
managers  at  BAA  and  some  of  the  construction  and  engineering  companies 
involved in T5, along with employer and employee representatives who took 
part in the processes set up under the MPA and SPA.  Ten (10) interviews were 
carried out between the autumn of 2006 and the spring of 2008.  We also made 
use of public statements of the principal employers’ associations, trade unions 
and BAA, and published audit reports conducted by the independent consultant 
Baker Mallett for the MPA Forum.  
 
3. T5: A unique project? 
 
3.1 The background to T5: governance at BAA, multi-firm contracting in 
construction, and the framework of collective bargaining in the electrical 
and mechanical trades 
The T5 project started during a period in which the principal client, BAA plc, 
was  still  a  listed  company.  BAA’s  governance  arrangements,  as  a  regulated 
utility, are complex, and evolved further in the course of the T5’s construction. 
BAA was established by the passing of the Airport Authority Act 1986, to take 
responsibility  for  four  state-owned  airports.  Prior  to  1986,  national  or  local 
government owned and operated the majority of UK airports and provided the 
finance for their development. The Airport Act 1986 commercialized 16 local 
authority owned airports and transformed the British Airports Authority from a 
government-owned  corporation  into  BAA  plc.  The  Act  also  introduced 
economic regulation of airport charges, principally to protect the airlines from 
monopoly charging behaviour by the airports. The three main London airports – 
Heathrow, Gatwick and Stansted – and Manchester airport have been subject to 
price caps on their aeronautical charges imposed by the Civil Aviation Authority 
(CAA).
4  In  February  2006,  BAA  was  approached  by  Groupo  Ferrovial,  a 
leading partner in a consortium, which declared an interest in acquiring BAA. In 
June 2006, Ferrovial officially took control of BAA after gaining 83% of its 
shares. In August 2006, BAA was de-listed from the London Stock Exchange,   6 
where it had previously been part of the FTSE100 index, and the company name 
was  subsequently  changed  from  BAA  plc  to  BAA  Limited,  signifying  its 
conversion from a public to a private company. The takeover by Ferrovial has 
not affected BAA’s status as a regulated utility.  As we shall see below, BAA’s 
transformation from a regulated utility and listed plc, which was then taken over 
in a bid mostly funded by debt influenced, at each stage, its approach to the T5 
project. 
 
It is also relevant to consider the nature of industrial relation in construction.  
The construction industry consists of around 168,000 firms; directly employed 
and  self-employed  workers  bring  the  employment  pool  to  just  fewer  than  2 
million employees working in construction in a multitude of roles, 1.2 million 
directly  employed  (BERR,  2007).  The  sector  encompasses  a  wide  range  of 
interest  areas:  large-scale  projects,  often  accompanied  by  high  levels  of 
employment and unionization. However, it has not, in recent years, enjoyed a 
reputation  for  harmonious  industrial  relations.  On  the  contrary,  it  has  been 
associated with casualization of employment, use of agency labour and ‘fake’ 
self-employment,  a  comparatively  high  level  of  labour  disputes,  declining 
coverage of collective agreements (Kersley et al., 2006: 110, 119), a dilution of 
training, a relatively poor health and safety record, and a low level of awareness 
of equality and diversity issues.  
 
The  nature  of  the  electrical  contracting  industry  is  also  relevant  here.    By 
contrast  to  construction,  electrical  contracting  is  a  sector  in  which  multi-
employer  national  bargaining  has  remained  relatively  strong.  It  is  distinctive 
both in the scope of application of its agreements and in the standards that it sets 
and there has been continuity in support for the collective agreement and for the 
Joint Industry Board (JIB) (Gospel and Druker, 1998: 249). The JIB regulates 
and controls employment and productive capacity, the level of skill, and wages 
and benefits of persons employed in the industry. This relatively stable industrial 
relations  background  played  a  critical  role  in  the  emergence  of  the  labour-
management partnership at T5. 
 
3.2. The emergence of the T5 Agreement, the MPA and SPA 
The construction of T5 is an example of a ‘megaproject’ (Flyvbjerg et al., 2003) 
because of its scale, complexity and high cost. The project was broken down 
into  18  major  projects  and  147  subprojects.  Construction  commenced  in 
September 2002; phase one of the project was completed in March 2008.
5 At 
any one time the project employed up to 8,000 workers, and as many as 60,000 
people were involved in the project over its lifetime. Its goal was to increase the 
airport’s capacity from 67 million to 95 million passengers a year. To achieve its   7 
objectives, BAA implemented a long-term strategy aimed at enhancing both its 
own capabilities and those of its main suppliers (Doherty, 2008).  
 
Partly  because  the  planning  process  for  T5  was  protracted,  BAA  had  the 
opportunity to learn from other projects both at Heathrow and elsewhere (Brady 
et al., 2008: 34). Further, BAA’s CEO in the mid-to-late 1990s, Sir John Egan, 
was instrumental in reassessing the way that large-scale construction projects 
were delivered. In 1998, under his chairmanship, the Construction Task Force – 
set up by the Government – published its report, Rethinking Construction. At the 
heart of the report was the conviction that an integrated project process would 
deliver  the  best  value  to  the  client  and  user  (Construction  Taskforce,  1998). 
Under  Egan’s  guidance,  BAA’s  senior  management  began  applying  the 
principles laid out in the report to improve project processes. In this context, a 
new process for organizing projects in BAA’s capital investment programme, 
promoting  integrated  team  working  and  a  set  of  framework  agreements  to 
achieve more accurate project costs, to implement best practice and to work with 
suppliers in longer-term partnerships was developed (Brady et al., 2008: 35).  
 
BAA’s solution to the problems raised by the construction of T5 was to develop 
a  bespoke,  legally  binding  contract  –  entitled ‘the  T5  agreement’  – between 
itself  and  its  key  suppliers.  The  agreement  was  described  by  BAA  itself  as 
‘groundbreaking’  and  ‘unique  in  the  construction  industry’  (BAA  Heathrow 
website). The contract governed BAA’s relations with 60 suppliers and formed 
the  basis  for  agreements  between  these  ‘first  tier’  contractors  and  their  own 
subcontractors.  The  essence  of  the  agreement  was  an  assumption  of  risk  by 
BAA: ‘at the heart of the terminal 5 agreement is the concept that BAA retains 
the risk while suppliers work as part of an integrated team to mitigate potential 
risk and achieve the best possible results’ (Wolmar, 2006; see also Brady et al., 
2008). This can be read as an acknowledgment that in a project of the size and 
importance of T5, a certain degree of residual risk necessarily lies with the client 
and  cannot  be  passed  on  to  the  contractors.  BAA  was  also  in  a  particularly 
vulnerable position as a regulated utility subject to price capping as well as the 
pressures which accompanied a stock exchange listing: it took the view that 
‘massive cost overruns or long delays to T5 would have wrecked the company’s 
reputation and sent its share price plummeting’ (Wolmar, 2006).
6  
 
In the T5 agreement, by assuming the residual risks of the project and ultimate 
responsibility  for  any  cost  overruns,  BAA  avoided  the  need  to  set  up 
contingency funds which are normal for large-scale construction projects in the 
UK.  Instead, project teams were allocated a small contingency fund which, if 
unspent, was then available for another team (Wolmar, 2006). BAA was also 
able to reserve for itself powers to monitor the performance of contractors and   8 
subcontractors, to set quality standards and, where necessary, to engage directly 
with  suppliers;  this  was  a  much  more  proactive  role  than  was  normal  in 
construction contracts of this kind. More generally, the T5 agreement was aimed 
at  minimizing  dispute  resolution  costs  and  avoiding  the  atmosphere  of 
adversarial  confrontation  which  was  perceived  to  have  affected  other  large 
construction projects in the UK: ‘essentially, it is a no blame culture aimed at 
getting  the  best  approach  through  cooperation,  rather  than  the  conventional 
adversarial approach’ (Wolmar, 2006). In this way, the integrated approach to 
partnering, as advocated by the Construction Task Force, was put into practice.  
 
BAA did not directly employ any of the workers involved in construction on the 
T5 site and was not a party to collective agreements relating to the construction 
project,  but  it  took  a  proactive  stance  on  labour  management  issues  and  on 
employment relations more generally on the site. The principles governing its 
approach included the negotiation of local agreements which were to be no less 
favourable  than  existing  national  and  sectoral  agreements;  the  use  of  direct 
labour in preference to other forms of employment, with only limited provision 
for  agency  work  to  meet  peaks  in  demand;  limits  on  overtime  working; 
establishing clear structures for basic wage rates and for productivity-related 
bonuses and allowances; the ‘cascading’ of agreed terms and conditions and 
employment  quality  standards  to  second-tier  subcontractors  and  suppliers, 
coupled with arrangements for the monitoring of their performance; setting and 
meeting  exemplary  levels  of  health  and  safety  protection;  and  a  proactive 
approach to diversity and equality issues (on the latter, see Clarke and Gribling, 
2008).  These  principles  were  reflected  in  the  two  main  sets  of  collective 
agreements governing the site: the Hourly Paid Employees Agreement which 
governed  the  civil  engineering  side  of  the  project,  and  the  Major  Projects 
Agreement  (MPA)  and  Supplementary  Project  Agreement  (SPA),  which 
together governed the provision of mechanical and electrical (M&E) services on 
T5. It is the second of these sets of agreements, the MPA and SPA, that provides 
the focus for our case study.  
 
At the time of the conception of the T5 project, the parties to the MPA were the 
principal  employers’  associations  in  the  M&E  sectors  –  the  Electrical 
Contractors’  Association  (ECA),  the  Association  of  Plumbing  and  Heating 
Contractors  (APHC),  the  Heating  and  Ventilation  Contractors’  Association 
(HVCA), the Electrical Contractors’ Association of Scotland (SELECT), and the 
trade  union  representing  workers  in  the  M&E  industries,  Unite  (previously 
Amicus).  The  MPA  was  designed  to  be  an  ‘umbrella’  collective  agreement 
designed specifically to deal with large construction projects. The impetus for its 
adoption  was  the  perception  on  the  part  of  the  employers’  associations  that 
clients wanted an integrated agreement that would unite terms and conditions   9 
governing  electrical  engineering  (electrical  installations)  with  mechanical 
engineering  (heating  and  ventilation).  Contractors  were  increasingly  offering 
both, but there were separate national-level collective agreements. All parties in 
the agreement accepted that the industry as a whole needed to address issues 
concerning the competitiveness of firms, product quality, and the provision of 
more secure, better remunerated and more satisfying employment. As already 
noted, the electrical contracting industry has the JIB agreement, going back to 
1968.  There  are  separate  agreements  for  plumbing  and  for  heating  and 
ventilation. In addition, parts of the engineering industry are covered by the 
National Agreement for the Engineering and Construction Industries (NAECI). 
Each  of  these  agreements  provided  aspects  of  the  model  for  the  MPA.  An 
employer  representative  from  the  ECA  explained  the  MPA  in  the  following 
way: ‘all collective agreements still apply, but what the MPA does is, it puts an 
umbrella, an overlay, across these agreements. It replaces one or two aspects of 
the agreement where it would be sensible to do so such as in the case of dispute 
resolution’ (interview notes).  
 
The MPA is a model agreement capable of being used in the context of any 
major construction project. So far, however, it has only been applied to T5, and 
T5, in turn, had been one of the catalysts for its development. In October 2001 
there  was  a  meeting  between  ECA  officials  and  BAA  managers,  at  which 
discussions took place over how BAA saw the emerging structure of industrial 
relations  at  T5.  BAA  wanted  to  avoid  having  a  multiplicity  of  collective 
agreements applying to the site. On the part of the Unite (or Amicus as it then 
was), there was strong support at national officer level for a single agreement. 
The negotiations lasted for the whole of 2002. The SPA was agreed between 
Amicus and the principal contractors on the M&E side at T5, namely AMEC, 
Balfour Kilpatrick and Crown House Engineering in November 2003. It was 
approved  by  the  parties  to  the  MPA  in  December  2003  (table  1  presents  a 
timeline of critical events in T5’s history). The structure, governance processes 
and  organization  of  work  were  thus  designed  jointly  and  agreed  by  the 
employers’ and workers’ representatives. 
 
For BAA, the adoption of the MPA and SPA complemented the goals of the T5 
Agreement, in terms of its explicitly cooperative ethos and its commitment to 
functional flexibility to suppliers and the workforce: ‘The MPA was absolutely 
about team work, integrated team working, so it moved away from a lot of the 
traditional  demarcation  issues  which  are  often  experienced  in  construction 
projects … We felt again in terms of commitment it was the best fit that would 
allow us to deliver what we needed to deliver. Again a lot of it was based on 
trust, again it took away a lot of traditional and adversarial ways of working’ 
(Human  Resources  (HR)  manager,  BAA,  interview  notes).  In  their  turn,  the   10 
parties  to  the  MPA  and  SPA  recognized  the  role  of  BAA  in  promoting  the 
agreements: ‘BAA are a very progressive and forward looking company. They 
very much wanted to go into partnership’ (Industrial relations (IR) manager, 
interview notes).  
 
In contrast to the role played by BAA and the willingness of the employer and 
union sides to reach agreement on the conditions for ensuring the success of 
major  construction  projects,  the  legal  framework  governing  employee 
representation, including ICER, played a minor role in the adoption of the MPA 
and  SPA.  Both  agreements  were  adopted  prior  to  the  transposition  of  the 
Information and Consultation Directive in the UK, and its coming into effect 
appears to have played no direct part in the process of their negotiation. The 
MPA  and  SPA  combined  the  two  elements  of  negotiation  and 
information/consultation  in  ways  which  are  not  unusual  in  UK  collective 
agreements.  An  ECA  representative  took  the  view  that  the  emergence  of 
information and consultation structures under the auspices of the MPA and the 
SPA was a natural development of the kind of collective bargaining which takes 
place in the construction industry under the JIB.  This agreement provides a 
single  set  of  structures  ‘picking  up’  both  aspects,  that  is,  bargaining  and 
information/consultation  (interview  notes).  The  main  contractors  who  were 
parties to the SPA made separate provision for information and consultation 
procedures under the ICER terms following its introduction, but these were not 
explicitly aligned with the arrangements made for T5. 
 
While  the  relationship  between  the  legislation  and  the  MPA,  according  to  a 
BAA industrial relations manager we interviewed, was ‘indirect’, the Directive 
was not, however, irrelevant, since ‘at the beginning we were very determined to 
put in place a communication and information culture at T5 that allowed people 
to feel part of the project. To help them understand that we are doing well, to 
help them understand where they are failing, to talk to them about key issues 
that would affect them’. In this sense there was a broader affinity between the 
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Table 1: Development of the MPA and SPA 
Date   Development  
October 
2001 
BAA indicated interest in T5 construction agreement 
Early 2002  Start of development work on the MPA within the ECA, 
HVCA and Select 
Creation  of  a  separate  working  group  to  develop  a  T5 
project agreement  
October 
2002 
Start of construction work at T5 
February 
2003 
Conclusion  of  negotiations  on  the  MPA  between  the 
Employers’ Associations and Amicus 
December 
2003 
Approval of the SPA by the MPA members  
Acceptance of the MPA by BAA 
January 
2004  




Handover  of  M&E  work  to  operational  readiness  and 
removal of the MPA and SPA 
March 
2008 
Opening of T5 
 
3.3 Key features of the MPA and the SPA  
The  MPA  is  intended  ‘to  lead  to  the  achievement  of  the  following  Key 
Objectives:  improvements  in  the  performance  and  productivity  of  the 
Mechanical and Electrical disciplines, and a radical and progressive overhaul of 
industrial relations on Major Projects’. In this context, a key principle of the 
MPA is a commitment on both sides to implement team working. According to 
the  MPA  (clause  11.2),  ‘the  principle  of  Integrated  Team  Working  is  the 
optimization and utilization of the skills of the M&E trades working together to 
improve  performance  and  productivity’.  The  MPA  provides  that  integrated 
teams  covering  all  the  M&E  trades  will  be  established,  with  the  precise 
composition of skills in each team being agreed locally. Each team member is 
expected to observe the principle of ‘operational flexibility’ (MPA, clause 11.3).  
 
In return for the union’s commitment to this form of functional flexibility, the 
Agreement  commits  the  employer  side  to  a  system  of  productivity-related 
bonuses which, in practice, have delivered levels of pay substantially above the 
standard  rates  for  the  relevant  trades;  the  core  of  this  is  the  ‘Major  Project 
Performance Payment’ (MPPP). The MPA also commits ‘employers and bona-
fide subcontractors to the employment of a directly employed workforce’. It also   12 
makes provision for the use of agency labour, ‘if unavoidable circumstances 
occur  and,  despite  the  best  endeavours  of  an  employer,  ‘top  up  labour’  is 
required (MPA, clause 12.4). However, it is also provided that agency workers 
come under the terms of the MPA, including its provisions on payment and 
bonuses, to the same extent as those who are in direct employment, and that they 
should  be  directly  employed  by  their  agencies,  and  not  be  employed  on  an 
individual  self-employed  basis.  Trade  union  membership  is  encouraged  and 
training and learning plans are envisaged.  
 
The SPA spells out in more detail the rules and principles governing payments 
of  wages  and  bonuses,  working  time,  health  and  safety,  training  and  related 
aspects of employment conditions. The SPA specifies that no bonuses will be 
payable  to  workers  in  respect  of  any  week  during  which  they  take  part  in 
unofficial strike action, or for any unauthorized absence during that week. It also 
sets out the principle of payment for ‘bell to bell working’, and the rule that 
employees have to ‘change into working clothes before clocking in at the start of 
the working day or shift and out before changing out of working clothes at the 
end  of  the  working  day  or  shift’  (SPA,  Appendix  3;  this  provision  is  also 
contained in the MPA, clause 15 ‘Efficient use of working time’).  
 
Aside from the provisions for integrated team working and bonus payments, the 
agreements also make a number of procedural innovations.  In particular, they 
establish several organizational structures for shared decision making. The union 
is to be a full partner in all organizational decisions and the project is to be 
governed by a joint labour-management council.  A consultative mechanism, the 
MPA Forum, is established under the auspices of the MPA. The Forum consists 
of representatives of parties to the agreement, with equal numbers on the union 
and employer sides, and has an independent Chairman. It meets at least four 
times a year. One of its core goals is to audit the project applying the Agreement 
and to receive reports on the progress. The SPA provides for a similar body, the 
T5 Joint Council. This body ‘operates by consensus and works as a partnership, 
with the success of the MPA and SPA on the Terminal 5 programme as its key 
objectives’ (Brawley, 2004: 41). It consists of equal numbers of trade union and 
employer representatives and has a number of functions including receiving and 
acting  on  audit  reports,  and  receiving  integrated  team  working,  training  and 
development  needs,  and  labour  resourcing  issues.  After  each  meeting  of  the 
Joint Council, a communiqué was placed on notice boards across the T5 site 
with the aim of ensuring that employees were aware of it.  
 
A  further  innovation  under  the  MPA  has  been  the  provision  made  for 
‘designated representatives’ to be nominated by the union side. Their role is 
similar to that of ‘convenors’ or senior shop stewards, but, differently from the   13 
normal role of such lay officials, their functions are defined with the aims of 
promoting the MPA in mind, and not simply in terms of protecting trade union 
members’ interests. They must, among other things, be employed as employees 
on the T5 site or that of any other relevant project, have five years experience of 
working in the engineering side of the building industry, and have substantial 
experience as an accredited trade union representative. They report to the local 
Amicus/Unite  full  time  union  officer.  Their  responsibilities,  which  must  be 
carried  out  ‘in  cooperation  with  Management’,  include  ‘[developing]  on  the 
project  …  an  environment  of  social  partnership’  and  ‘[promoting]  industrial 
relations harmony and the avoidance of recourse to unofficial actions’, as well 
as  more  traditional  goals  such  as  ‘[ensuring]  the  maximum  take-up  and 
compliance with Trade Union membership’ (MPA, clause 20). Under the terms 
of the SPA for T5, both of the designated representatives sat on the T5 Joint 
Council.  
 
In its origins, its structure and its stated objectives, the SPA is characteristic of 
the ‘stakeholder’ approach to governance as defined by Kochan and Rubinstein 
(2000).  The unions and the workforce more generally were given a key voice in 
the strategic, operational and employment decisions relating to the construction 
of T5.  The objectives set out for the agreement (see Table 2) were explicitly 
‘integrative’ in the sense that the identification of the separate and overlapping 
interests of the different parties, and their involvement in the decision-making 
process, were seen as the precondition for meeting the project’s overall aims 
(Healey et al., 2004).   
 
Table 2: Objectives of the SPA  
To establish and maintain an environment in which accidents and work-
related ill-health are eliminated 
To  meet  the  needs  of  Heathrow  Airport  Ltd  by  completing  the 
Programme to time and within budget 
To establish and maintain industrial relations stability on the Programme 
by providing an effective and pro-active industrial relations framework 
for all works within scope of the Agreement 
To reward performance and productivity 
 
3.4 The operation of the MPA and SPA 
How successful were the multi-firm arrangements contained in the MPA and 
SPA  in  terms  of  overcoming  the  fragmentation  of  employee  representation 
across different employment units which is normally associated with such large-
scale construction projects?  Beyond the context of T5, ‘the thing to bear in   14 
mind is that out in the big bad world those companies’ – the first-tier suppliers 
who  were  signatories  to  the  SPA  –  ‘would  be  competitors’  (IR  manager, 
interview notes). Within T5, on the other hand, as a result of integrated team 
working,  an  ‘extraordinary  amount  of  cooperation  at  all  levels  between 
industrial relations managers’ (IR manager, interview notes) was developed. The 
concept of integrated teams was implemented through the establishment of a 
joint  working  party  between  employers  and  the  union,  through  which 
Amicus/Unite  was  able  to  participate  fully  in  its  organization  and 
implementation at site level. Close relations between labour and management 
were  sustained  by  a  number  of  other  means.  The  concept  of  designated 
representatives – modelled, as we have seen, on the traditional convenor role – 
was not new, but their role of supporting and implementing the MPA and SPA 
was. The activities of the designated representatives took place in conjunction 
with  consultative  meetings  between  individual  stewards  and  each  contractor, 
between the stewards and representatives of all contractors, and at Joint Council 
level.  Informal  consultation  between  the  designated  representatives,  the  shop 
stewards or the union regional officer and the IR managers responsible for the 
site also took place on a regular and frequent basis..  
 
Although the MPA and SPA emphasized the importance of communication and 
cooperation  in  labour-management  relations,  this  did  not  mean  that  disputes 
were not expected. Indeed, what was sought was an effective system of dispute 
resolution. There is evidence of learning taking place around the experience of 
operating the MPA and SPA. When the MPA was agreed, it was assumed that 
most  issues  would  be  ‘company-based’  and  that  the  first  two  stages  of  the 
procedure would be used. In reality, most issues were raised at stage two and the 
failure of negotiations at that stage would result in the issue being taken off-site. 
Consequently, the outcomes of two stage-three panels were unacceptable to one 
or both parties. Both parties recognized that issues were going to non-T5 bodies 
prior to detailed discussions being held, and identified a need to create a new 
stage three to allow a further opportunity to resolve issues at project level before 
passing  them  to  non-T5  parties.  Agreement  was  also  reached  on  a  more 
structured approach to the new stage-four panels with the cooperation of the 
MPA Forum.   
 
More generally, the recognition that enabling the effective operation of unions 
on site would be a positive factor contributing to the successful delivery of the 
construction  project  went  beyond  the  formal  terms  of  the  agreements.  The 
employers encouraged workers to join an appropriate union and every worker 
starting on the project had the right to attend a section during induction about 
trade union membership. Office facilities and time for meetings between the 
union nominated shop stewards were also provided on site. As a result of the   15 
operation of the designated representatives and the shop stewards, Amicus/Unite 
was able to recruit over a thousand new members at the site. 
 
Both sides saw the involvement of BAA as a proactive client as critical to the 
agreements’ operation and the avoidance of the development of an adversarial 
relationship between the suppliers themselves and between the suppliers, the 
workers and the union. On their side, BAA recognized that the Joint Council 
was an effective forum for communication and consultation and that it allowed 
both sides to raise and resolve issues and concerns. BAA’s role was illustrated in 
other ways. At the instigation of BAA, an M&E employee engagement manager 
was appointed with responsibility for implementing and delivering an employee 
engagement  programme  and  reporting  back  on  its  development  to  the  Joint 
Council. Further, as a result again of BAA’s intervention, a single, common 
standard on procedures for dealing with bullying and harassment on the T5 site 
was adopted. A decrease in bullying was reported: in June 2004, 19 per cent of 
just under 1,300 front-line workers said that bullying was taking place at T5. In 
June 2005, this figure had fallen to 8 per cent (IDS, 2006).  
 
Training was also seen by all sides as key to achieving the consistent application 
of  the  MPA  and  SPA  on  site.  In  line  with  the  MPA  and  SPA  guidelines, 
supervisors received training on the agreements and on handling diversity and 
the  first-tier  contractors  ran  10-day  courses  on  the  theme  of  ‘successful 
supervision’. The union also confirmed that shop stewards and health and safety 
representatives  accessed  all  the  training  they  had  requested.  Finally,  BAA 
worked as ‘a guiding hand’ (Doherty, 2008: 212) for the introduction of adult 
trainee schemes.    
 
3.5 Meeting project objectives 
Table 3 summarises the main outcomes of the project.  Employer and employee 
representatives alike viewed these outcomes positively. Firstly, the goal of an 
above-industry average health and safety record was met.
8 Secondly, industrial 
relations stability was provided.  No days were lost to industrial action on the 
M&E side of the project.
9 Thirdly, while employers and the trade union thought 
that there had been scope for further productivity improvements, no use was 
made of the provisions in the MPA and SPA for reduction or suspension of 
productivity-related bonuses paid to the workforce. There was less consensus on 
a number of other issues. The goal of a consistent application of the provisions 
of collective agreements governing terms and conditions of employment was 
met, but the issue of exceptions to the use of direct labour was a contentious 
one.  The employer view was that agency labour was explicitly contemplated by 
the terms of the MPA, and that it was only used at T5 to meet unexpected peaks 
in demand; agency workers were guaranteed equivalent terms and conditions to   16 
directly employed labour, so it was not used as a means of cutting direct labour 
costs. The union view was that the use of agency labour was excessive, and that 
it undermined training programmes and their efforts to recruit union members.
10  
 
Table 3: Key organisational outcomes  
Indicators  Results  
Budget   4.3b (on budget) 
Completion time   On programme
11  
Peak number of operatives   2284 (March 2006) 
Peak number of construction 
support services (CSS) suppliers  
Ratio of CSS whilst on site (26 
months)  






Hours achieved without a life 
threatening incident  
1m 15 times 
2m 3 times 
Working hours   9.6m hours worked with no lost 
time to disputes  
Labour turnover (1
st tier suppliers)   5.4% (industry average for the JIB: 
15%) 
Absenteeism   3.54% of hours worked
12 (industry 
average: 4%)  
2.2% sickness (authorized)  
1.3% unauthorized  
Training of apprentices/trainees   6.79% of the workforce (peak)  
6.93% (during the designation 
period)  
Qualifiers through adult trainees 
schemes  
20  
Training of supervisors   80% coverage  
 
Source: Baker Mallett (2008) 
 
Further evidence on perceptions of outcomes is available from independent audit 
reports.  Baker Mallett was appointed by the MPA Forum as the independent 
auditor to the T5 project in April 2004 and was subsequently asked to prepare a 
study on the implementation of the MPA on the T5 Programme. In the August 
2005  study,  results  based  on  interviews  with  a  small  cross-section  (24 
individuals)  of  suppliers,  tradesmen,  supervisors,  union  representatives  and 
managers were reported. 88% of all respondents thought that the T5 Programme   17 
had been improved by the introduction of the MPA and SPA. The principal 
reasons cited were: pay alignment, cooperation between contractors, consistency 
of application of rules governing pay and terms and conditions of employment, 
high levels of earnings, and high levels of retention of labour (turnover under the 
MPA  was  around  5%  compared  to  around  50%  as  the  construction  industry 
norm).  The  principal  differences  between  the  MPA  and  other  projects  were 
reported to be a higher level of training, better structuring of working hours, a 
good relationship between first-tier and second-tier suppliers, and consistency of 
terms  and  conditions  of  employment.  The  survey  of  all  respondents  also 
reported favourable views on integrated team working, including ‘references to 
cooperation  and  a  better  understanding  between  trades,  reduction  in  ‘blame 
culture’, better communications and better understanding of other disciplines by 
supervisors’; demarcation issues had not, in general, been a problem.  
 
On  the  employer  side,  around  60%  of  employer  respondents  thought  that 
productivity on the site had improved as a result of the MPA, citing the role of 
bonus payments, the linking of planned levels of output to performance targets, 
the use of visible standards and rules on productivity, and better continuity of 
working as a result of the absence of an afternoon tea break. 14% of employer 
respondents thought that there had been no improvement in productivity and 
29% had no opinion either way. Employer respondents with experience of other 
projects reported that the agreements had resulted in better performance  and 
productivity than the industry norm, and that sickness and absence levels were 
also better. Around two-thirds of the employer respondents thought that bell-to-
bell working had resulted in greater productivity ‘although the responses were 
qualified  by  statements  such  as  ‘captive  workforce’  and  ‘only  with  efficient 
supervision’.  Roughly  the  same  proportion  also  thought  that  the  industrial 
relations climate at T5 was better than on other major projects, although some 
attributed this to high earnings which meant that there was more to lose in the 
event of a dispute.   
 
On the employee and union side, a quarter of the union representatives surveyed 
by Baker Mallett reported that their members told them that they had received 
benefits under the MPA, the principal ones being pay alignment, high earnings, 
and industrial relations stability; 13% said that their members were not aware of 
any benefits; and 62% reported both benefits and drawbacks. The main reasons 
members reported no benefits from the MPA were the use of agency labour, the 
ban on site meetings – a monthly site meeting was provided for under the JIB 
agreement applying elsewhere in the electrical contracting sector - and a lack of 
understanding of the rules. For similar reasons, 37% of union respondents said 
that their members’ aspirations were not being met compared to 25% reporting 
that they were met, and 37% reporting that some were and some were not. 50%   18 
of  the  Unite  respondents  said  that  their  members  were  reporting  greater  job 
satisfaction as a result of the MPA, citing higher earnings as the most important 
factor; 12% reported less job satisfaction, referring in particular to the absence 
of the monthly JIB meeting; and 28% reported greater job satisfaction in relation 
to  earnings  but  concerns  over  grievance  procedures  and  a  number  of  other 
issues. On the basis of this report, suggestions for improvement to the MPA 
were put forward; these included greater clarity in the wording of certain clauses 
to  eliminate  the  potential  for  ambiguity,  possible  inclusion  of  related  trades 
including Thermal Insulation, the earlier identification of in-scope contractors, a 
more active role by the union in drawing up the SPA, and the reinstatement of 
the monthly meeting for the JIB operatives (Baker Mallett, 2008: 16).  
 
4. Assessment and conclusion  
If the T5 had followed the industry norm for construction ‘megaprojects’, it 
would  have  been  between  18  and  24  months  late,  over  budget  by  a  billion 
pounds, and would have involved the deaths of six people (NAO, 2005).  How 
can the above-average outcome of the project be explained?  In the first place, 
the T5 Agreement was based on a novel approach to risk-sharing under which 
BAA accepted that the residual risk of failure would remain with it as the client 
whatever  stipulations  were  made  for  penalty  clauses  in  contracts  with  its 
suppliers.  However, the T5 Agreement also addressed wider organizational and 
cultural  issues.    The  Agreement  has  been  described  as  epitomizing  a  ‘move 
away from the lowest initial cost tendering to long term value with suppliers 
who  are  able  to  invest  in  people,  innovation,  research  and  development  and 
equipment’, a process which ‘has been demonstrated in the results BAA has 
achieved  through  increased  productivity,  improving  value  and  programme 
predictability  and  below  industry  accident  statistics  (Lane,  Lepardo  and 
Woodman,  2005:  3;  see  also  Harty,  2005).  Having  a  single  approach  to 
contractual  relations  with  the  main  suppliers  and  their  own  subcontractors, 
consistently applying the terms of collective agreements and bringing the unions 
into the decision making process through the MPA and SPA were all part of this 
strategy (Doherty, 2008: 205).   
 
The wider context also played a role.  At the outset, BAA saw itself as in a 
situation where the project’s failure would be reputationally disastrous, bearing 
in mind its position as both a utility, subject to regulatory pressure for service 
improvements, and a listed company required to meet shareholder expectations. 
This was the background against which BAA decided to take an interventionist 
line in the design of the contractual infrastructure of the project.  BAA’s explicit 
adoption of a stakeholder approach, which cascaded down into the MPA and   19 
SPA, confirms the suggestion that a stock market listing is not incompatible 
with a company taking with a long-term orientation to shareholder returns, when 
combined  with  regulatory  pressures  of  the  kind  which  utility  companies  are 
generally subject to (Deakin et al., 2006).  
 
The takeover by Ferrovial seems to have had little impact on the completion of 
the T5 project.  Commenting on the impact upon BAA of the takeover, the CAA 
said that while questions marks existed over BAA’s handling of the heightened 
security  requirements  and  over  its  recruitment  of  security  staff,    ‘BAA  had, 
however, proved very good to excellent in some areas, in particular Terminal 5 
construction’ (Competition Commission, 2007: 1).  However, it should be borne 
in mind that the takeover occurred several years after the contractual framework 
for  T5  had  been  put  in  place;  BAA’s  new  owners  were  locked  into  the 
arrangements which had been agreed. In 2007-8 discussions took place between 
BAA and the MPA Forum concerning the application of MPA in future BAA 
projects, in particular the plan for a new Heathrow East Terminal to replace the 
ageing Terminals 1 and 2.  At this point, BAA was being subjected to new 
regulatory pressures. The CAA had agreed to increase the charges paid by the 
airlines to use the London airports but it had also reduced the return BAA was to 
be allowed to make until 2013 (Gordon and Mulligan, 2008). In April 2008, the 
Competition Commission published an interim report, explaining its ‘emerging 
thinking’  concerning  the  structure  of  the  UK  airports  market.  The  regulator 
stated  that  BAA’s  common  ownership  of  seven  airports  in  the  south-east  of 
England  and  Scotland  ‘adversely  affected’  competition  (Competition 
Commission, 2008). However, Ferrovial managed to secure fresh financing for 
BAA  in  a  deal  that  took  some  of  the  financial  pressure  off  the  Spanish-led 
consortium  (Mulligan  and  Sakoui,  2008).  It  remains  to  be  seen  whether  the 
MPA  will  be  used  for  the  Heathrow  East  terminal  or  whether  a  different 
approach will be taken in view of the nature of that project, which will be unlike 
the T5 project in that it will involve the removal of two existing terminals and 
their replacement with a new terminal whilst continuing to operate the airport 
throughout the life of the project.  
 
The  wider  future  of  the  MPA  is  surprisingly  unclear  given  its  successful 
implementation at T5.  Both the M&E suppliers and Unite have promoted the 
MPA as a model for further large construction projects, in particular the work 
for the completion of the London Olympic Games and Paralympic Games in 
2012.  According  to  Amicus’s  response  to  the  Olympic  Delivery  Authority’s 
Draft Procurement Policy, ‘there is a consensus view that the Major Projects 
Agreement … adopted for Terminal 5 has set new standards in organising major 
construction projects … The MPA has firmly established its value to the client, 
contractors and workforce on the Terminal 5 project, with enhanced welfare,   20 
health  and  safety,  employment  reward  and  industrial  relations  stability  for  a 
project of such a large size’. In October 2007, representatives of the thermal 
insulation contracting industry signed up to the MPA. The addition of TICA to 
the current signatories of the MPA means that the MPA now represents the full 
range of building services engineering disciplines. Despite the expansion of the 
MPA members and the success of the agreement at T5, officials at the Olympic 
Delivery Authority (ODA) confirmed in February 2008 that the MPA would not 
be  used  to  cover  M&E  work  across  the  2012  sites.  The  high  costs  of 
implementing the MPA (Prior, 2008) and the ODA view on the allocation of risk 
reportedly played a role in the decision. 
 
Is  T5  destined  to  be  a  truly  unique  project,  one  which  confounded  normal 
expectations of adversarialism in British industrial relations, but which, by its 
very  distinctiveness,  confirms  this  general  trend?    It  is  unnecessary  to  look 
beyond  the  opening  of  Terminal  5  on  27  March  2008  to  see  some  familiar 
problems re-emerging.  Large numbers of British Airways (BA) flights were 
cancelled when the baggage handling operation broke down.  It was reported 
that BA had ignored union warnings that baggage staff had not been properly 
trained to use the new automated system (Radio 4, 2008; Webster, 2008). BAA 
publicly maintained that since baggage handling was at the interface with BA, it 
could not be tested effectively before the opening (Radio 4, 2008). 
 
The successful conclusion of T5 project suggests that it is possible to espouse a 
stakeholder  model  of  governance  within  a  context  where  strong  legal  and 
institutional support for employee voice is lacking.  The project succeeded in 
meeting  a  wide  range  of  objectives  which  included  enhancing  productivity, 
cutting costs and ensuring a high quality of end project, while maintaining high 
employment  standards.  This was  only possible  because  parties  with  multiple 
interests participated in the design of the project from its inception and were 
represented  in  the  deliberative  processes  through  which  the  project  was 
managed.  Employee representation, productivity bonus schemes, flexible work 
systems  and  investments  in  training,  were  bundled  together  to  achieve  high 
levels of productivity and quality in employee relations. Employees were asked 
to  agree  to  flexible  working  practices  in  return  for  enhanced  bonuses  and  a 
commitment  to  the  use  of  regular,  direct  employment  and  the  consistent 
application of collective agreements.  
 
The  Saturn  experiment  studied  by  Kochan  and  Rubinstein  (2000),  after  a 
similarly  promising  start,  expired  against  a  background  of  employer  inertia, 
union disenchantment, and shareholder pressure for quick returns.  There is a 
case  for  seeing  Saturn’s  failure  as  evidence  that  labour-management 
partnerships cannot endure in an environment, such as that in the United States,   21 
which provides little institutional support for the stakeholder approach.  We may 
have  a  better  idea  of  the  prospects  for  labour-management  partnerships  in 




1 However, these authors (Pendleton and Gospel, 2005: 79) also recognize that 
the network of relationships between firms and major investors also provides a 
quick and effective means for investors to force changes on management when a 
firm is in difficulty.  
2 Legislation now imposes information and consultation requirements in respect 
of certain events, such as impending redundancies (Chapter II, Part IV of the 
Trade  Union  and  Labour  Relations  (Consolidation)  Act  1992  (TULR(C)  A 
1992), as amended) and transfers of undertakings (The Transfer of Undertakings 
(Protection of Employment) Regulations 2006, SI 2006/246) and in respect of 
multinational  companies  through  the  European  Works  Council  model 
(Transnational Information and Consultation of Employees Regulations 1999, SI 
1999/3323). 
3 The Information and Consultation Regulations 2004, SI 2004/3426. 
4 BAA owns and operates seven of the UK’s airports at Heathrow, Gatwick, 
Stansted, Southampton, Glasgow, Edinburgh and Aberdeen. 
5 The second phase is due to open in 2011.  
6  In  other  projects,  including  the  construction  of  the  new  Wembley  football 
stadium and the extension of the Jubilee line on the London underground, legal 
costs had formed a substantial proportion of budget overruns. There had also 
been widespread bankruptcies among suppliers forced to absorb the costs of late 
completion.   
7 The SPA was applied retrospectively to cover the period since 4 December 
2003, when M&E work started at T5.  
8 Two people lost their lives, against an expectation of six deaths for a project of 
this size.  In terms of major injuries, 600 were expected. This was the equivalent 
to  the  reportable  incidences,  and  in  fact  T5  was  three  times  better  than  the 
industry average (Doherty, 2008: 112). In repeated employee surveys, over 75% 
of the workforce felt that T5 was the safest site they had worked on and over 
60% thought it was a good place to work (Doherty, 2008: 106).  
9 Doherty (2008: 208) notes that ‘while coming very close to disputes on a few 
occasions, with the most militant being the mechanical and electrical workforce, 
there was ultimately a T5 strike for seven days among the civil engineering 
workforce.’    In  the  interviews  we  carried  out  with  employer  and  employee 
representatives, the absence of industrial action in the M&E side was partially   22 
 
attributed  to  the  definition  of  bonus  regimes  prior  to  the  commencement  of 
M&E work in the MPA and SPA. While there was some tension over the up-
rating  of  bonuses,  the  approach  taken  to  implementing  this  aspect  of  the 
agreements  was  described  as  effective,  giving  certainty  to  both  workers  and 
contractors, to the substantial benefit of the project itself. A further relevant 
factor was that SPA specified that no bonuses would be payable to workers in 
respect  of  any  week  during  which  they  take  part  in  unofficial  strike  action.  
Worker attitudes to this potential penalty were ambivalent, with some seeing it 
as an undue constraint on their participation in union activities (interview notes). 
10 Changes to tax law acted as a catalyst in a dispute over employment status.  
Under the Finance Act 2007, that income received by individuals who provide 
services to an end user via a ‘managed service company’ or  ‘MSC’ became 
taxable  as  employment  income.  In  T5,  a  great  number  of  labour  agencies 
provided labour through the so-called ‘composite company’ vehicle: workers 
were classified as directors of their own company, rather than employees of the 
agency of the contractor that had hired them. Workers received dividends which 
were classed as ‘unearned income’ so that it was not taxable under PAYE. The 
union claimed that the replacement mechanisms that the agencies used so as to 
comply with the 2007 legislation did not comply with the MPA and SPA, as 
they amounted to self-employment. The dispute went to stage 4 of the dispute 
resolution procedure and the panel set up for considering the issue decided in 
favour of the union. In another occasion, industrial action was averted in the last 
months of 2007. The issue concerned the organisation of selective industrial 
action over the negotiations over pay that were at that time taking place outside 
the scope of the MPA and SPA. 
11  The  total  clocked  hours  were  9,762,347.  7,764,595  were  basic  hours, 
1,439,482 were overtime from Monday to Friday and 558,269 were overtime 
during the weekend.  
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